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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SALT LAKE CITY,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.
JOSEPH HOWE,
-~

Case No. 20141013 -CA
Dist. Ct. Case No. 131911063MO

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant appealed his Conviction for Lewdness Involving a Child, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code §76-9-702.5. This Court has jurisdiction
~

pursuant to Utah Code §78A-4-103(2)(e) wherein the Court is granted jurisdiction in
appeals from a court of record in criminal cases.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION

A. Issues:
1. Whether the non-specific motion for directed verdict preserved the specific
grounds for appeal.
Standard of review: To the extent that Defendant did not preserve his claims before the
trial court~ he must establish plain error, ineffective assistance of counseL or exceptional
circumstances to wairant review by this court. See State v. Lmv, 2008 UT 58, ~ 19, 192
..ii)

P.3d 867; State v. Ko-:.lov, 2012 UT App 114,

,r 28 . 276 P.3d 1207, 1218.

1

"Each basis for such review of an unpreserved issue presents a legaJ question that
we review for correctness." See State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, il 6, 89 P.3d 162.

2. The trial court was correct in denying the motion for a directed verdict
when the testimony established that the defendant was observed in an act
characterized as masturbating by three witnesses.
Standard of review: The review of a denial of a motion for directed verdict is

correctness of the trial court's conclusion that the evidence established a prima facie case.

State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289, 988 P.2d 949. We review a trial court's ruling on a
motion for directed verdict for correctness. Ferguson v. Williams & Hunt, Inc., 2009 UT
49, iJ 19,221 P.3d 205.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, RULES, AND STA TUTES

Utah Code 76-9-702.5:
A person is guilty of lewdness involving a child if the person under
circumstances not amounting to rape of a child, object rape of a child,
sodomy upon a child, sexual abuse of a child, aggravated sexual abuse of a
child, or an attempt to commit any of those offenses, intentionally or
knowingly does any of the following to, or in the presence of, a child who is
under 14 years of age:
(c) masturbates;
(d) performs any other act of lewdness
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702.5
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellee is satisfied with the Defendant's statement of the case.

2

STATEMENTS OF FACTS 1
On September 14, 2013 at a park located in Salt Lake City, Mr. And Mrs.
Lindsley and Mr. Buie observed a man sitting near a tree next to a playground adjacent
to an off leash dog park. All witnesses identified the defendant as the man sitting near
the tree. Mr. Lindsley testified that he thought the defendant's position with his jacket
draped over the front of him seemed a "little bit odd." R. 64:59 Mr. Lindsley continued
to state that he couldn't see underneath what the defendant had draped over him, but
"seemed to be moving in a manner" that lead Mr. Lindsley to believe "he might be
touching himself." R. 64:60. Mr. Lindsley was concerned and called the police. He
stated that the defendant was ten to fifteen feet from the playground. Id. Mr. Lindsley
stated that the defendant's same actions continued for about 15 minutes until the police
arrived. R. 64:61. He stated that there were "about a dozen kids playing" in the
playground and Mr. Lindsley's two minor children were with him. R. 64:58. The
defendant remained fixated on "looking at the children playing" despite other activity
going on around the park. R. 64:63.
Mrs. Lindsley had similar testimony, but specifically stated "Umm, what I
believed to be [occurring] was the defendant masturbating. Though his lap was
covered, it appeared as if he was sitting, facing -to me it looked like he was facing the
children with something of a fixated expression on his face and it looked to me as if he
1

The City agrees with the defendant that the evidence to be considered should only be the
evidence presented prior to the motion for directed verdict, and will not cite to testimony
or facts that were introduced after the motion for directed verdict. The City objects to
Defendant's use of his own testimony which was not presented to the court at the time the
trial court ruled on his motion for directed verdict. See App. Brief pg 8.
3

was masturbating underneath some kind of cover because his hands were invisible and
there was a bit of a gyrating motion that I witnessed." R. 64: 65-66. She stated that her
own minor children were with her and that the defendant was ten to fifteen feet from
the playground which had fifteen to twenty children present. R. 64:67-68. Mrs.
Lindsley testified that this activity occurred for ten to twenty minutes. Id.
Mr. Buie testified that he "saw a man sitting next to a tree right in front of the
playground area and he had a jacket over his waist area and it looked like he was
masturbating." R. 64:73. When asked why it appeared the defendant was masturbating,
Mr. Buie replied "[b]ecause there was pretty vigorous movement underneath the jacket
that looked like it was masturbating. It wasn't the whole body moving, ... it appeared
to be just the arm moving underneath the jacket in the crotc~ area." Id. Mr. Buie
testified that the children in the area appeared to be between the ages of four and eight.

R. 64:74
Officer Southworth testified that when he arrived the defendant became very
nervous and slowly removed the jacket and "[the defendant] looked down at his pants
with particular interest ... [at] a wet spot on his pants." The spot was on the defendant's
genital area. R. 64:78. Officer Southworth on cross examination stated that the wet
spot was small, and if it was urine it was not a lot. R. 64:81. When asked by Officer
Livsey, the defendant stated that his "penis leaked." R. 64:85. Officer Livsey when
asked by defense counsel if it could have been urine, he testified that it would have
been a small amount, and in his experience "[t]ypically when people urinate
themselves there's quite a bit more liquid than that." R. 64:89.
4

After the testimony of Officer Livsey, the City rested. The Defendant upon the
Court asking if there were any motions stated:
"Yes, Your Honor, I would move for a directed verdict. I do not believe the city
has met their burden to prove that a reasonable jury would be able to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that this offense actually occurred. I would submit." R. 64:94.
The Court denied the motion for directed verdict.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant failed to specifically challenge the evidence and made only a pro
forma motion for directed verdict. By summarily challenging that the City has not met
their burden without providing specifics that the court could rule on, Defendant failed
to preserve his claim that the evidence failed to show he had the intent or did not
commit a lewd act in the presence of children.
The defendant challenging a denial of a directed verdict must overcome a substantial
burden on appeal to show that the trial court erred in denying the motion for a directed
verdict. The City presented sufficient evidence in it case-in-chief through witnesses, who
stated they believed the defendant to be masturbating, that the defendant was in the park
committing a lewd act in the presence of children.

5

ARGUMENT

I. This Court should decline to address the specific challenges to the evidence as
Defendant did not preserve the issue with his generic directed verdict motion.
"To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must first raise the issue in
the trial court, giving that court an opportunity to rule on the issue." Weiser v. Union
Pac. R.R. Co., 2010 UT 4, ,r 14,247 P.3d 357. Defendant failed to preserve the issue
with specificity that the court could address each of the three elements Defendant raises
on appeal. Defendant does not address any of the necessary elements to challenge an
issue which is not preserved. "When a party fails to preserve an issue for appeal, we
will address the issue only if ( 1) the appellant establishes that the district court
committed "plain error," (2) "exceptional circumstances" exist, or (3) in some
situations, if the appellant raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in failing
to preserve the issue. State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49, ,r 18, 122 P.3d 566; State v.

Hansen, 2002 UT 114, ,r 21 n.2, 61 P.3d 106.2 as cited in State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ,r
19, 192 P.3d 867,874. In the present case Defendant simply stated that he "move[s] for
a directed verdict." Defendant without specificity argued, "I do not believe the City has
met their burden to prove that a reasonable jury would be able to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that this offense actually occurred." R. 64:94. This argument is
insufficient for the court to rule on as a motion. "When evaluating a motion for a
directed verdict 'the court is not free to weigh the evidence and thus invade the
province of the jury, whose prerogative it is to judge the facts.' Rather, the court's role
is to determine whether the state has produced 'believable evidence' on each element
6

of the crime from which a jury, acting reasonably, could convict the defendant." State
v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ,r 32, 84 P.3d 1183, l 190-9l(intemal citations omitted). In the

present case the testimony was consistent that it appeared to the 'civilian' witnesses
that the defendant was masturbating, and the officers' testimony supported those
witnesses' reasonable belief.
"A generic motion for directed verdict will preserve a specific ground for appeal
when "the specific ground for an objection is clear from its context." State v. Gonzalez,
2015 UT 10, ,f 26, 345 P.3d 1168, cited in State v. Isom, 2015 UT App 160, ,I 22 789
Utah Adv. Rep. 21. It is not clear in the present case as it was clear in Gonzales what
the defendant's theory of the case was. In Gonzales the Defendant's opening statement
made it clear to the court that his theory was self defense. When Gonzales moved for a
directed verdict, "the trial court would necessarily have understood from the context
that [the defendant] was asserting that the State had failed to meet its burden of
showing that he had not acted in self-defense." Id. The opening statement made by
Defendant in the present case focused on illusions, magic tricks, and burdens of proof.
R64:54-56. The theory of the defendant's case was not made clear to the court, and the
court would have no understanding of the context of the generic motion for directed
verdict.
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on
appeal." In deciding whether a motion made in the trial court was sufficient to preserve
an argument made on appeal, we look to rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which requires a motion to "state succinctly and with particularity the
grounds upon which it is made and the relief sought." Where the grounds upon which a
motion is made before the trial court differ from the grounds argued on appeal,
appellate courts will generally dismiss those arguments as unpreserved.
7

State v. Gonzales 2015 UT 10 ,I 24 345 P.3d 1168 at 1175.(intemal citations
omitted)
Defendant has not raised any plain error, exceptional circumstances or
ineffective assistance claims in his brief, which would be necessary for this Court to
review an unpreserved issue.
II. The Trial Court did not err denying the directed verdict motion, and

evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for Lewdness Involving a
Child.
Defendant has not shown that the evidence could not support a conviction nor has
he showed that the City failed to establish a prima facia case against Defendant.
A defendant must overcome a substantial burden on appeal to show that the trial
court erred in denying a motion for directed verdict. We will uphold a trial
court's denial of a motion for directed verdict "based on a claim of insufficiency
of the evidence" if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, "some
evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the
crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Montoya, 2004 UT
5, ,I 29, 84 P.3d 1183 (internal quotation marks omitted). [Defendant] must
therefore show that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, no
evidence existed from which a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable
doubt that [defendant committed the crime].
Gonzalez v. State, 2015 UT 10, ,I 27,345 P.3d 1168, 1176
Defendant has failed to state evidence that would show that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for directed verdict. The City in this case presented evidence that
the witnesses concluded that Defendant was "touching himself' or "masturbating" and
children were present. R. 64:60, 65-66, 73. The only disputing evidence2 the trial court

2

Other evidence was presented by the Defendant after the motion for directed verdict.
The City maintains that it is not proper for this Court to review evidence not known to the
trial court at the time when reviewing a denial of Defendant's motion for directed verdict.
8

could consider regarding the motion for directed verdict was elicited through
statements Defendant made to Officer Livsey stating that Defendant was a religious
person, would never do something like that [masturbate] and that "he could have been
scratching himself'. R. 64:84.
Testimony was presented that Defendant was alone at the time and that his
actions were his own and voluntary. This court has recognized that "a defendant's
mental state can be proven by circumstantial evidence, including the nature and extent
of the criminal act" State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, 1179, 299 P.3d 892. The evidence
presented was that the defendant was engaged in this act that was described as
masturbation. There was no evidence presented that the defendant was not acting
intentionally or that he was not in control of his arms. Defendant stated to Officer
Livsey that he was intentionally sitting under that tree. R64:87. "It is well established
that "criminal intent is seldom proved by direct evidence but must be instead inferred
from the circumstances of the given facts." State v. Cases 2003 UT 55148, 82 P.3d
1106 citing State v. Castonguay, 663 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Utah 1983). The City
concedes that it did not present direct proof that Defendant was masturbating. None of
the witnesses saw Defendant manually manipulating his bare genitals for sexual
gratification. It would be nearly impossible for a prosecution to show with direct
evidence that a masturbatory act was done for gratification as gratification can only
exist in the mind of the individual. The prosecution can show circumstantial evidence
that the act is pleasurable (such as a wet spot or facial expression), but without a

9

statement from a defendant that the act was gratifying, the prosecution must rely on
circumstantial evidence.
In the present case, Defendant maintained his demeanor, posture and activity for
ten to twenty minutes. R. 64:70. His activity was more than a casual scratch or rub.
Defendant continued the same fixated expression and gyrating motion during that
time. R. 64: 65-66. Defendant's "vigorous movement underneath the jacket that
looked like [he] was masturbating" R. 64:73.
Given the evidence that Defendant continued this activity longer than 10 minutes,
it is proof that Defendant's motions under his jacket were more than a casual or
inadvertent motion; Defendant was intentionally moving his arm in a masturbatory
manner. The trial court did not err when it denied Defendant's motion for directed
verdict as a prim a f acia case was presented.

A. The district court properly found that a reasonable jury could reasonably
infer, from the evidence presented, that Defendant committed an act of
lewdness.
The trial court correctly denied Defendants motion for a directed verdict based
on the evidence presented.
[T]he distinction between reasonable inference and speculation is intensely
fact-based. When evidence supports only one possible conclusion, the quality of the
inference rests on the "reasonable probability that the conclusion flows from the proven
facts." Id. When the evidence supports more than one possible conclusion, none more
likely than the other, the choice of one possibility over another can be no more than
speculation; while a reasonable inference arises when the facts can reasonably be
interpreted to support a conclusion that one possibility is more probable than another.
State v. Cristobal, 2010 UT App 228, if 16,238 P.3d 1096, 1101.
The City presented sufficient evidence to prove Defendant was engaged in a
10

lewd act, masturbation, or that Defendant was simulating masturbation. There was no
other explanation presented to explain why the observations of the witnesses could not
support a conclusion that Defendant was engaged in a lewd act.
In reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed verdict based on a claim
of insufficiency of the evidence, we will uphold the trial court's decision if,
upon reviewing the evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn
from it, we conclude that some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury
could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. Therefore, a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the state's
case may be denied if the trial court finds that the state has established a prima
facie case against the defendant by producing 'believable evidence of all the
elements of the crime charged.' The evidence is to be viewed in the light most
favorable to the state.
State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ,r 29, 84 P.3d 1183, 1190 (internal quotations and
citations omitted)
The evidence presented at the time of the motion for directed verdict supports
the conclusion that Defendant was either masturbating or in an act similar to
masturbation which is a lewd act. "To an objective viewer, [the defendant] conveyed
the appearance of masturbation .... It is precisely this type of conduct that the
legislature intended to prohibit in enacting the statute." State v. A. T. (in Re A.T.), 2001
UT 82, ,r 10, 34 P.3d 228,232. In State v A.T., the defendant grabbed his crotch over
his clothes in a manner that was a deliberate simulation of masturbation. Id.
Defendant in the present case was in public, although he draped a jacket over him, and
was staring fixatedly at the playground and moving his arms in a manner which led the
witnesses to conclude that he was engaged in the act of masturbation. The Officers
observing a wet spot on the groin area of Defendant's pants supports the conclusions
of the witnesses.
11

B. Defendant was in the presence ofchildren when he committed the Lewd act.
Nothing in the statute requires the children to have any other involvement.

Lewdness involving a child specifically states in sub part 1 "A person is guilty
of lewdness involving a child if... intentionally or knowingly does any of the following
to, or in the presence of, a child who is under 14 years of age" UCA §76-9-702.5

(emphasis added). The text of the statute makes clear the acts that are prohibited being
done "to or in the presence of' a child. This court need not determine if the statute is
lacking clarity, as it is unambiguous that any of the acts committed upon or in the
presence of a child are a violation of the statute. It is clear from the wording that the
alternative of"or in the presence" does not require the crime be committed upon the
child directly, but that it occurred with the child present. "Only if we find the statutory
language to be ambiguous may we tum to secondary principles of statutory
construction or look to the statute's legislative history" State v. Ireland, 2006 UT 17, ,r
11, 133 P.3d 396, 399. "Our overall goal is to give effect to the legislative intent, as
evidenced by the statute's plain language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant
to achieve. Further, we assume the legislative body used each term advisedly and in
accordance with its ordinary meaning." Baby E.Z. v. T.lZ, 2011 UT 38, ,r 15,266 P.3d
702, 707 (internal citation and quotations omitted). The wording of the statute is
construed to prohibit exposing a child, who may or may not know what the act is, from
sexual activity.
"This wording of the lewdness involving a child statute proscribes the exposing
of a child to sexual activity, and the general term "any other act of gross lewdness" 3 is
3

The statute was amended in 1994 House Bill 335 to remove the word "gross" from "any
other act of lewdness"
12

.;;

restricted to a sense analogous to such wording. These acts are committed either by the
actor upon him or herself, or committed by the actor with or upon a person other than
the victim, in the presence of the victim who must be under fourteen years of age .
State v. Vogt, 824 P.2d 455,458 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis added)
Utah Code defines "in the presence of a child" in three places: §76-3-203.9 and
§76-3-203.10 (violent offenses committed in presence of a child), and §76-5-109.1
(domestic violence in the presence of a child). In all three definitions the consistent
language in the statute is "having knowledge that a child is present and may see or hear
[the act]". (emphasis added) Utah code does not provide a definition specifically for the
sections §76-9-702.5 (the charge in this case) nor Sex Offender in the Presence of a Child
(§77-27-21.8). "[T]he plain language of a statute is to be read as a whole, and its
provisions interpreted in harmony with other provisions in the same statute and with other
statutes under the same and related chapters." State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, 18, 63

P.3d 667, 669-70 (internal citations and quotations omitted. Emphasis added). Reading the
"in the presence" language in harmony with other chapters of Title 76 of the Utah Code

provide clear direction that "in the presence" means that a child is present and may see or
hear the act.
Reading the statute as Defendant proposes would require involvement of the
child is contrary to Utah law about how child victims relate to criminal conduct. Utah
Code §77-37-4 (2) (Victims' Rights- Additional rights - Children) states "Children
are not responsible for the inappropriate behavior adults commit against them and have
the right not to be questioned, in any manner, not to have allegations made, implying
this responsibility ... " UCA §77-37-4 (2010). Construing the statute as Defendant
suggests would require the child who was in the presence when the act occurred be
13

'involved' would require that the child "be included in some activity ... and take part
in" the inappropriate behavior of the adult. See App. Brief 18.
G

The trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion for directed verdict as
the statute is unambiguous and clearly stated that the prohibited conduct must not be
done to or in the presence of a child. The other sections of the code defining "in the
presence of a child" are consistent that the child must be present and may see or hear
the act. Lewdness involving a child does not require 'involvement' of a child, as the
child is not responsible for the behavior of the adult.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, this Court should affirm the district court's
denial of Defendant's motion for a directed verdict.

SUBMITTEDthis3td dayofAugust,2015

Attorney for Plaintiff/ Appellee
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76-9-702.5. Lewdness involving a child .
.;;

(1)

A person is guilty of lewdness involving a child if the person under circumstances not

amounting to rape of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, sexual abuse of a child,
aggravated sexual abuse of a child, or an attempt to commit any of those offenses, intentionally
or knowingly does any of the following to, or in the presence of, a child who is under 14 years of
age:
(a)

perfonns an act of sexual intercourse or sodomy;

(b)

exposes his or her genitals, the female breast below the top of the areola, the

buttocks, the anus, or the pubic area:
(i)

in a public place; or

(ii)

in a private place:

(A)

under circumstances the person should know will likely cause affront or alarm; or

(B)

with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of the actor or the child;
(c)

masturbates;

(d)

under circumstances not amounting to sexual exploitation of a child under Section

76-Sb-201, causes a child under the age of 14 years to expose his or her genitals, anus, or
breast, if female, to the actor, with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of the
actor or the child; or

~

(2)

(e)

performs any other act of lewdness.

(a)

Lewdness involving a child is a class A misdemeanor, except under Subsection

(2)(b).
(b)
~

Lewdness involving a child is a third degree felony if at the time of the violation:
(i)

the person is a sex offender as defined in Section 77-27-21.7: or

(ii)

the person has previously been convicted of a violation of this section.

Amended by Chapter 278, 2013 General Session

76-3-203.9. Violent offense committed in presence of a child -- Aggravating factor.
( 1)

As used in this section:
(a)

"In the presence of a child" means:
(i)

in the physical presence of a child younger than 14 years of age; or

(ii)

having knowledge that a child younger than 14 years of age is present and

may see or hear a violent criminal offense.
(b)

"Violent criminal offense" means any criminal offense involving violence or

physical harm or threat of violence or physical harm, or any attempt to commit a criminal offense
involving violence or physical harm.
(2)

The sentencing judge or the Board of Pardons and Parole shall consider as an aggravating

factor in their deliberations that the defendant committed the violent criminal offense in the
presence of a child.
(3)

The sentencing judge or the Board of Pardons and Parole shall also consider whether the

penalty for the offense is already increased by other existing provisions oflaw.
(4)

This section does not affect or limit any individual's constitutional right to the lawful

expression of free speech or other recognized rights secured by the Constitution or laws of Utah
or by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
(5)

This section does not affect or restrict the exercise of judicial discretion under any other

provision of Utah law.

Enacted by Chapter 347, 2007 General Session

76-3-203.10. Violent offense committed in presence of a child -- Penalties.
,;;

( 1)

As used in this section:
(a)

"In the presence of a child" means:
(i)

in the physical presence of a child younger than 14 years of age; and

(ii)

having knowledge that the child is present and may see or hear the

commission of a violent criminal offense.
(b)

"Violent criminal offense" means any criminal offense involving violence or

physical harm or threat of violence or physical harm, or any attempt to commit a criminal offense
involving violence or physical harm that is not a domestic violence offense as defined in Section
'(J)

77-36-1.
(2)

A person commits a violent criminal offense in the presence of a child if the person:
(a)

commits or attempts to commit criminal homicide, as defined in Section 76-5-201,

v})

against a third party in the presence of a child;
(b)

intentionally causes or attempts to cause serious bodily injury to a third party or

uses a dangerous weapon, as defined in Section 76-1-601, or other means or force likely to
produce death or serious bodily injury, against a third party in the presence of a child; or
(c)

under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (2)(a) or (b),

commits a violent criminal offense in the presence of a child.
(3)

A person who violates Subsection (2) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.

Enacted by Chapter 359, 2010 General Session

76-5-109.1. Commission of domestic violence in the presence of a child.
(1)

As used in this section:
(a)

"Cohabitant" has the same meaning as defined in Section 78B-7-102.

(b)

"Domestic violence" has the same meaning as in Section 77-36-1.

(c)

"In the presence of a child" means:
(i)

in the physical presence of a child; or

(ii)

having knowledge that a child is present and may see or hear an act of

domestic violence.
(2)

A person commits domestic violence in the presence of a child if the person:
(a)

commits or attempts to commit criminal homicide, as defined in Section 76-5-201,

against a cohabitant in the presence of a child; or
(b)

intentionally causes serious bodily injury to a cohabitant or uses a dangerous

weapon, as defined in Section 76-1-601, or other means or force likely to produce death or
serious bodily injury against a cohabitant, in the presence of a child; or
(c)

under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (2)( a) or (b ),

commits an act of domestic violence in the presence of a child.
(3)

(4)

(a)

A person who violates Subsection (2)(a) or (b) is guilty of a third degree felony.

(b)

A person who violates Subsection (2)( c) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.

A charge under this section is separate and distinct from, and is in addition to, a charge of

domestic violence where the victim is the cohabitant. Either or both charges may be filed by the
prosecutor.
(5)

A person who commits a violation of this section when more than one child is present is

guilty of one offense of domestic violence in the presence of a child regarding each child present
when the violation occurred.

Amended by Chapter 70, 2009 General Session

